The battle lasted for three and one-half years, from the beginning of 19928 until June 19, 1995, when the United States Supreme Court decided the case in favor of the private parade organizer's First Amendment right to choose its own marchers. 9 In the first year, Judge Hiller Zobel of the Massachusetts Superior Court ordered that GLIB march, against the wishes of the parade organizers.' In the second year he did likewise." In the third year, once a full trial before Judge J. Harold Flannery resulted in a permanent injunction, 2 which was affirmed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), 3 the Veterans Council which sponsored the Parade chose to cancel it rather than include the marchers with the message it found objectionable. 4 [Vol. 30:663
and thus the Veterans could exclude GLIB, notwithstanding the permanent injunction requiring GLIB's inclusion.' 7 The United States Supreme Court by then had granted certiorari to decide whether the permanent injunction" 8 was consistent with the First Amendment, regardless of whether there was a protest theme to the Parade.
9
A. Why the Veterans Resisted GLIB's Suit to Enter the Parade The Veterans group, which organized the St. Patrick's Day Parade every year since 1 9 4 7 ,° was loathe to serve as a vehicle for "gay pride" messages." Part of the reason was social. South Boston is a conservative, family-oriented neighborhood. ' Part was religious. "Southie" is heavily Catholic, 2 3 and St. Patrick is the patron saint of Boston's Catholic Archdiocese. 24 Catholicism teaches that non-marital sex is wrong because it is not open to procreation, and homosexual acts are included within the ban.' Catholicism also commands loving your . In a footnote, the Veteran's Council stated that an award of attorneys' fees had been imposed upon it, and that additional fee awards were being sought. Id. at 2 n.l. Moreover, the Veterans Council noted that it was "potentially subject to criminal penalties arising out of the Massachusetts Court's decision." Id. at 2. When GLIB replied to all these points in its Respondents' Reply Concerning Mootness, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338 Ct. (1995 , it represented to the Supreme Court that the "Respondent no longer has any wish to seek to collect attorneys' fees, either for the 1992 case or for the present case, and counsel represents to the Court that appropriate steps to permanently relinquish those claims will be taken forthwith." Id. at 10. As of June 19, 1995, the day the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, no such steps were taken. 20. 2351-2359 (1994) [hereinafter enemies and sinners, though deploring the sin.' In doing so, the Catholic Church distinguishes carefully between "homosexual acts," which are "intrinsically disordered," ' and persons with "homosexual tendencies," who deserve respect, compassion and sensitivity, and are entitled to be protected from unjust discrimination.' The distinction was lost on GLIB. Indeed, one of GLIB's founders, according to press reports, had called New York's Cardinal John O'Connor a "homophobe." 29 Given the context of the Parade, GLIB's action in seeking to march can only be called provocative. It was confrontational, in-your-face politics. GLIB thought it had an easy target. South Boston, scarred by its years of fighting forced busing, 3 " was deemed a blue-collar bastion of traditional attitudes by a politically correct mindset." "Homophobia," in the minds of radical activists, was akin to racism. 2 Professor Larry W. Yackle, one of the signers of GLIB's brief for the Supreme Court, had written in a law review article that was submitted in draft form to the trial court: "In the summer of 1990, ACT-UP/Boston disrupted the ordination of several young priests at the Holy Cross Cathedral in the South End. The protestors staged a mock gay wedding, shouted vulgarities, and threw condoms at priests and their families." 33 Mar. 6, 1992 , at 21 (quoting GLIB co-founder Barbra Kay as saying that the Veterans' refusal to admit GLIB was "'a smoke screen for bigotry'). All of the above articles quote GLIB members as equating their attempts to march in the Parade with the civil rights struggle, and describe the Veterans' stance as bigoted discrimination.
33. Yackle, supra note 5, at 838.
garding his concern that people from the protest at Holy Cross Cathedral would participate in the Parade, as part of GLIB's contingent. 34 It was no surprise that in GLIB's promotional brochure, the return address was not South Boston, but Cambridge. 3 5 These two communities are actually worlds apart. 36 Indeed, in 1995, Cambridge held its own St. Patrick's Day Parade, an offspring of this conflict." GLIB marched, as did a number of other homosexual contingents, and even a vehicle with anti-homosexual signs was included in the Cambridge parade.
3 ' All of this was quite unremarkable in Cambridge. In South Boston, however, a "gay pride" message would have gotten maximum attention, because it would have been considered an affront to the values many residents hold dear. 
GLIB's Motives Revealed
The trial court found as a fact that GLIB was organized to march in the Veterans' Parade. ' GLIB's trial testimony and its own brochure had stated why GLIB was formed. In a section headed "GOALS," the following were listed: "Celebrate our Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian and bisexual individuals. is open to all gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals of Irish descent and others interested in Irish and Irish-American issues." ' 42 At trial, Barbra Susan Kay, the co-founder of GLIB, testified that GLIB had no set criteria for membership and that people "can be members of the group as long as they support our stated goals." 43 A fact sheet published by GLIB prior to the 1992 march stated, " [w] e are committed to providing approximately 50% of the marching slots to the general gay community." ' Two important things were clear from GLIB's literature: 1) Central to GLIB's purpose was the proclamation and celebration of homosexuality (the "gay pride" theme); 4 ' and 2) one did not have to be homosexual to belong to GLIB or march behind its banner.' These facts would cripple GLIB's argument at the Supreme Court. 47 Judge Flannery, the trial judge, found that GLIB's purposes were threefold:
to express its members' pride in their dual identities; to demonstrate to the Irish-American and to the gay, lesbian, and bisexual communities the diversity within those respective communities; and to show support for the Irish-American gay, lesbian, and bisexual men and women in New York City ("ILGO" Members) who were seeking to participate in the New York St. Patrick's Day Parade.'
Any differences with GLIB's stated purposes were incidental and cosmetic. 49 Judge Flannery found, however, that "GLIB was excluded from the Parade on account of its members' sexual orientation." 5 A footnote to his decision demonstrates how Flannery reached that conclusion: "GLIB would be excluded because of its values and its message, i.e., its members' sexual orientation." 51 Judge Flannery, in equating GLIB's message with its members' sexual orientation, however, ignored the In this regard, GLIB's amended complaint had alleged that the Veterans and the City had "refused to allow them to march in the 1993 Parade because of Plaintiffs' sexual orientation and because of the content of their expression."" As counsel for GLIB said in his opening statement at trial, "We will . . . show that the thrust of the action by the Veterans and the city is not to make a determination of GLIB as an organization or to criticize GLIB. The thrust of this is to preclude GLIB's message from being heard either in Boston or elsewhere." 57 This claim was unsuccessful because it depended upon a showing of state action. 5 " The Veterans' refusal to include GLIB among the marchers had to be shown to be a result of governmental action in order to trigger the First Amendment." GLIB, by suing both the Veterans and the City of Boston, attempted to show this. ' Moreover, no one from the City of Boston, no one from the Veterans Council, no witness, and not even Judge Flannery went so far as to make the bald assertion of joint organization and administration. GLIB advocated this position on the evidence, and on the evidence Judge Flannery rejected it. See GLIB I, 1 Mass. L. Rptr. No. 18 at 375-77. GLIB failed to appeal this issue, and before the Supreme Court, GLIB explicitly acknowledged that state action was not even at issue. Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2344.
61. GLIB 1, 1 Mass. L. Rptr. No. 18 at 373 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). These findings by the trial court went to the issue of whether the City of Boston was liable for aiding or inciting discrimination based upon sexual orientation-conduct that is also forbidden by the anti-discrimination statute. See id. (citing MASS. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 98 (1994)). These findings, however, were also relevant to the trial court's determination that there had been no state action. vate actor, could now assert the First Amendment itself. 63 Indeed, when the Veterans appealed the case to the SJC, GLIB's brief did not appeal the ruling on state action. 6 ' Instead, it stated that the "Court should deny the Veterans Council appeal and affirm in all respects the rulings of the Trial Court below." 2. GLIB's Public Accommodation Argument "The second tack is to protect ourselves as gays and lesbians from discrimination in public accommodations under the gay rights legislation." ' This alternative theory had the tactical advantage of not requiring state action for GLIB's claims to go forward, for places of public accommodation (e.g., restaurants and theaters), could be privately owned and operated, but nonetheless subject to anti-discrimination laws. 67 In Massachusetts, as in other states, discrimination in places of public accommodation on the basis of race, sex, and, most recently, sexual orientation, has been prohibited. 6 The argument required construing the Parade itself as a place of public accommodation because it used the public streets, and because it was generally open to the public. ' 63. GLIB 1, 1 Mass. L. Rptr. No. 18 at 377. 64. GLIB II, 418 Mass. at 245 n.12, 636 N.E.2d at 1297 n.12. Although GLIB's initial brief did not contest the dismissal of its claims against the City, GLIB attempted to raise the issue in its reply brief to the SJC. Id. The SJC, however, noted that GLIB failed to file a cross appeal. Therefore, GLIB neither had the right to file a reply brief, nor had it properly raised the issue for appeal. 
The First Amendment as a Shield
One problem with the public accommodation argument was that it had been rejected by the Federal District Court in New York in a similar case. 7 " New York City's Human Rights Commission had attempted to apply the public accommodation ordinance to the New York St. Patrick's Day Parade," but the court ruled as follows:
The main problem with the logic of the decision of the City's Human Rights Commission is that it starts the analysis at the wrong end. The first question that should have been considered is not whether the New York St. Patrick's Day Parade is a public accommodation, but whether the Parade and its message constitutes speech protected by the First Amendment guarantee of Freedom of Speech. Insofar as a parade constitutes protected free speech, it cannot be a public accommodation. 72 The Massachusetts trial court, however, came to a different conclusion. After a four-day bench trial, the Suffolk County Superior Court found that the Veterans Council did not generally inquire into the specific messages of the groups which applied to march, had no written standards or procedures in selecting participants, and was not selective in choosing the diverse groups which participated in the Parade. 73 Citing "the lack of genuine selectivity in choosing participants and sponsors," 74 the court found that the Parade was a public event, 7 " and had no specific expressive purpose. 76 The trial court found that the Parade constituted a public accommodation under Massachusetts law and ruled that "the Veterans' exclusion of GLIB based on the sexual orientation of its members violates the public accommodations statute." 77 As noted earlier, the trial court also found that "GLIB would be excluded because of its values and its mes- sage, i.e., its members' sexual orientation," ' 78 and, "[tihe evidence establishes that GLIB was excluded from the Parade on account of its members' sexual orientation." 79 In his decision, Judge Flannery concluded that "[h]istory does not record that St. Patrick limited his ministry to heterosexuals or that General Washington's soldiers were all straight. Inclusiveness should be the hallmark of their Parade." ' Judge Flannery ordered the Veterans Council "permanently enjoined from preventing plaintiff GLIB from participating in the St. Patrick's/Evacuation Day Parade because of the group members' sexual orientation."'" The court "further ORDERED that the defendant Veterans Council shall allow plaintiff GLIB to participate in the Parade in the same manner and under the same terms and conditions applicable to all other participants in the Parade. On February 16, 1994, the Veterans Council appealed the Superior Court's decision to the SJC and was granted direct appellate review. 83 The Veterans argued that the Parade constituted "expressive activity" protected by the First Amendment, asserting its rights to free speech, expressive association, and freedom from being compelled to communicate or foster views in which the Veterans did not believe." The Veterans further argued that the public accommodation statute was constitutionally invalid as applied, as well as facially vague and overbroad. 85 On March 11, 1994, just before the scheduled 1994 St. Patrick's Day Parade, the SJC issued an order affirming the Superior Court's decision, and noted that written opinions would follow. 6 Council's freedom of speech" and expressive association,7 and that the trial judge's finding that the Veterans had discriminated on the basis of GLIB's members' sexual preference was clearly erroneous. 9 8
The Veterans Council's Petition to the United States Supreme Court for Writ of Certiorari," however, was granted on January 6, 1995."° The Veterans' lead counsel and legal team took it as a good omen for their prospects of reversing the Massachusetts Judiciary. The Veterans' argument partly rested on the thoroughness of review required in a case in which First Amendment claims were made."°T he SJC had applied a "clearly erroneous" standard; ° therefore, findings of fact would be reversed only if found to be "clearly erroneous. °8 In an unusual move, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed an amicus brief "in support of neither party."' 4 It was a carefully balanced production. On the one hand, the ACLU assured the Supreme Court that the First Amendment is important." On the other hand, the ACLU, holding dear its Gay and Lesbian Rights project, argued that ending discrimination against gays and lesbians is important. 2 f this is what the movement had been saying for years, counsel for GLIB was a recent convert. What she had been saying was that GLIB's only message was "Happy St. Patrick's Day.'' A number of predictions made in the "Fact Sheet" proved not only that prophecy is an elusive gift, but that GLAD was being wantonly glib. "Plainly and simply, the Veterans are using the First Amendment in this case as a pretext to justify discrimination against gay, lesbian and bisexual people."' 42 In other words, the case was really about discrimination and not about the First Amendment. The [Vol. 30:663 E. Amici There were two amicus briefs filed in support of GLIB: one by the Irish Lesbian and Gay Organization (ILGO), the group that had attempted to march in the New York City St. Patrick's Day Parade; 5 the other by the Anti-Defamation League and joined by many other civil rights organizations."
II. BRIEFING The Questions Presented for

F. The Reply Brief
The Veterans Council's Reply Brief reiterated the claim that "[w]hat the facts describe is a conflict between two sides: a longstanding private group that runs a parade, and a newly-formed group that has lately sought to use that parade to make its own statement."' 52 According to the Veterans, "this The Reply Brief took issue with GLIB's attempt to minimize the communicative content of its own participation in the Parade.' 57 GLIB contended that the Veterans merely had "to allow GLIB marchers to march while self-identifying as lesbians, gay men or bisexuals by means of a banner."' ' 8 But as Nan D. Hunter, a lesbian scholar, wrote:
The idea of identity is more complicated and unstable than either simply status or conduct. It encompasses explanation and representation of the self. Self-representation of one's sexual identity necessarily includes a message that one has not merely come out, but that one intends to be out-to act on and live out that identity. Notions of identity increasingly form the basis for gay and lesbian equality claims. Those claims merge not only status and conduct, but also viewpoint, into one whole. To be openly gay, when the closet is an option, is to function as an advocate as well as a symbol.' 59 From quite a different perspective, Oxford University scholar John Finnis noted that
[t]he phrase "sexual orientation" is radically equivocal. Particularly as used by promoters of "gay rights," the phrase ambiguously assimilates two things which the standard modem position carefully distinguishes: (I) a psychological or psychosomatic disposition inwardly orienting one towards homosexual activity; (II) the deliberate decision so to orient [Vol. 30:663 presumptively involve such conduct.
It is also widely observed that laws or proposed laws outlawing "discrimination based on sexual orientation" are always interpreted by "gay rights" movements as going far beyond discrimination based merely on A's belief that B is sexually attracted to persons of the same sex. Instead (it is observed), "gay rights" movements interpret the phrase as extending full legal protection to public activities intended specifically to promote . . . homosexual conduct." 2 Far from being a mere matter of self-identification, then, the expression of one's sexual orientation was fairly teeming with significance. At the very least, it was a significant message. GLIB's co-counsel before the Supreme Court, Professor Yackle, acknowledged this in his law review article: '
6
[T]here is some substance to the claim that the exclusion of gay and lesbian groups, as opposed to individual homosexuals marching with other units, is not discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation at all, but rather is discrimination on the basis of the point of view that ILGO and GLIB represent. ludicrous. The rule GLIB proposed was, for all intents and purposes, that one cannot discriminate against gay pride messages unless one is actually hateful or explicitly anti-gay. 65 The Veterans Council concluded its Reply Brief as follows:
In sum, GLIB's position invites continual litigation about every privately-sponsored parade. Professor Yackle has written that "extant constitutional doctrine does not generate a clear answer, but only beckons a difficult exercise in balancing-in every case and in every year." Without a reversal of the lower courts' decisions in this case, the Veterans' Council will be compelled to either 1) silence its voice, as in 1994; 2) conduct future Parades with the governmentally enforced inclusion of a message and viewpoint favored by the state, as in 1992 and 1993; or 3) submit its claim that it has reformulated the Parade into a protected expression to a judge for his or her approval, as in 1995. Based on the record in this case, the Petitioners ask for a resounding and categorical First Amendment ruling that will protect privately organized parades from governmental control of content." 6 A parade "falls [well] within the sphere of conduct protected by the First Amendment." Indeed, one can scarcely imagine a more definitive and graphic way for a citizen to manifest himself to the world than to march down the street, arm-in-arm with friends and neighbors, displaying his allegiances for all to see.
To abandon the anonymity of the crowd and take a place in the lists is to affirm as few other actions can the ideas and people one calls her own. 
C. Ward's Fatal Initial Concession
Before GLIB's lead counsel John Ward could even say, "May it please the Court," Chief Justice Rehnquist nailed down the state action issue that had been raised by Justice Ginsburg. I " 2 He got Ward to concede that the issue was not properly before the Supreme Court, 3 even though the Respondent's Brief attempted to raise the issue through the back door." 4 In his decision for the Court, Justice Souter acknowledged that the state action question was not at issue. 5 Most interesting, however, was John Ward's attempt to downplay the expressiveness of GLIB's participation in the Parade. He said, for example, that it did not help to look at the case in terms of messages."
6 Ward perhaps realized the implications of the central facts; the case was about competing messages in the St. Patrick's Day Parade, and whose message would govern-that of the Veterans, the Parade organizers, or that of GLIB. 8 7 Ward implied that the notorious equation of GLIB's messages and values with its members' sexual orientation, which was effected in the trial court's opinion,"' 8 merely reflected the Veterans' own confusion of the two concepts. 89 courts' application of the public accommodation statute to the St. Patrick's Day Parade, requiring inclusion of a message that the organizers did not wish to convey, violated the First Amendment." 9 Overcoming the lower court's factual findings, the Supreme Court ruled that it had a duty, where First Amendment interests were implicated, to conduct an independent examination of the record as a whole. 9 ' Defining "parades" as "marchers who are making some sort of collective point, not just to each other but to bystanders along the way,""' the Court forcefully ruled that parades are inherently expressive. John Ward summed up his argument on behalf of GLIB by saying that,
[i]n the end, this is a case about discrimination. The finding of the two courts below, well-supported in the record, was that the reason, the real reason that GLIB was kept out was its members' sexual orientation and not any message, because there was no message in that sense .... "
Whether self-identifying as homosexual was a message, then, was squarely at issue in this case. 2 " GLIB was slicing it too thin in arguing that it had no message." 7 In this regard, the Supreme Court's decision is surprising for what it did not say. It did not explicitly say that self-identification as homosexual is an expressive message protected from state-ordered inclusion (or, presumably, exclusion) by the First Amendment. The opinion's discussion on this point was more circumspect. 8 Perhaps this was because the Court did not want to prejudge cases that were clearly on the horizon; cases challenging, for example, the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. ' The United States Supreme Court's opinion also paid SJC Justice Joseph R. Nolan quite a compliment by summarizing and quoting from his dissent. 210 It was a nice gift for the outgoing Justice, who retired from the bench at age 70 shortly before the Hurley decision was announced. 2 '
For someone who followed the case closely, it was remarkable that the case of Wooley v. Maynard" 2 was cited only once in the Supreme Court's opinion, and only as part of its account of the SJC opinion of Justice Nolan. 3 While the Supreme Court did cite West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette," 4 the leading "compelled speech" case, Wooley was not cited in the body of the holding. A number of possible reasons for this omission exist. One is that Justice Souter, when he was the New Hampshire Attorney General, had signed the Wooley brief, on the losing side." 5 It is probably not one of his favorite precedents. But Chief Justice Rehnquist had also dissented in that case, 216 and it is probably fair to conclude that it is not one of his favorites, either. Presumably the opinion had to be written as inclusively and as non-controversially as possible to preserve unanimity, and that may have precluded reliance on Wooley.
Perhaps more to the point, however, Wooley was not necessary. Because the Supreme Court had accepted the Veterans' argument that parades were inherently expressive, 1 7 there was no need for authority for the proposition that even if they were not, private parties would still be entitled to freedom from government-coerced expression of someone else's message. 8 Indeed, because both the Veterans and GLIB were trying to express something through the Evacuation Day/St. Patrick's Day Parade, 219 this was an exceptionally easy case culminating in a unanimous decision.
Because the Court decided the case under the free speech rationale, 220 it did not need to reach the Veterans' expressive association argument .2 Nonetheless, the Court distinguished New York State Club Association v. City of New York, 2 2 which upheld application of a public accommodation law to a private club, on the ground that compelled access to the public benefits offered by the club did not trespass on the organization's message itself. 223 The Hurley Court, however, stated that,
[i]f we were to analyze this case strictly along those lines, GLIB would lose. . . . GLIB could . . . be refused admission as an expressive contingent with its own message just as readily as a private club could exclude an applicant whose manifest views were at odds with a position taken by the club's existing members. 224 Although this is technically dictum, it is nonetheless very significant dictum, since it was joined by all the members of the Court. One must think that it was said because the concerns expressed by groups like the Boy Scouts, in its amicus brief, " weighed heavily with the Justices. The Court did reject the Veterans' challenge to the public accommodation law as being overbroad, once it was interpreted by the SJC as applying to expressive activities like the Parade. 26 This was not surprising, since the application of the law in this particular case was so "peculiar" that the Court did not have to reach the facial challenge. 7 Nor is it likely that the questioning of the anti-discrimination law would have achieved anything like unanimity on the present Court.
V. CONCLUSION: A ROTUND REJECTION OF STATE-CONTROLLED
ExPRESSION
The real question that presented itself about this case is why all this litigation was necessary, if the legal principle was so clear? The fact is that GLIB was interested in the confrontation, and while it takes two to make a fight, it only takes one to start one. GLIB wanted to make a statement similar to the one made by ILGO. 228 On its face, the object of the law is to ensure by statute for gays and lesbians desiring to make use of public accommodations what the old common law promised to any member of the public wanting a meal at the inn ...
[that] they will not be turned away merely on the proprietor's exercise of personal preference. When the law is applied to expressive activity in the way it was done here, its apparent object is simply to require speakers to modify the content of their expression to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with messages of their own. But in the absence of some further, legitimate end, this object is merely to allow exactly what the general rule of speaker's autonomy forbids. Id. at 2350 (emphasis added).
228. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
suit. The Veterans, on the defensive, simply kept appealing, all the way to the United States Supreme Court. By then, GLIB may have preferred to walk away, but the battle lines had already been drawn. Fortunately, the story has a happy ending. The First Amendment won. The Court's unanimous rejection of the "very idea" that the state could impose a viewpoint through the control of speech and expression should resonate throughout First Amendment jurisprudence.
The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people, grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression. The Speech Clause has no more certain antithesis. 229 
